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THE DUTY TO RESCUE: A REEXAMINATION AND
PROPOSAL
JAY SILVER*
From time to time, national attention is drawn to the issue of a
legal duty to assist those in distress. In 1964, accounts of the mur-
der of Kitty Genovese on a New York City street horrified the na-
tion. Over the course of thirty-five interminable minutes, the
young woman was repeatedly stabbed as she cried for help and
crawled toward the door of her apartment building. Thirty-eight of
her neighbors looked on from the safety of their own apartments
above the well-lighted street, but none summoned help. Well after
her attacker had fled, a single caller notified the police, who were
on the scene within two minutes.1 A stunned public learned that
Ms. Genovese's neighbors had violated no law. Legal commentators
called for legislative reform, but within a few years the issue had
faded from view.
Recently, a series of incidents involving callous bystanders has
rekindled interest in creating a "rescue" duty. The most notorious
incident, in which patrons of a bar near Boston cheered for over an
hour as four men raped a female customer,2 has already spurred
passage of a public rescue duty in Minnesota and, in Massachu-
setts and Rhode Island, a duty on the part of witnesses to report
certain crimes.' As similar legislation is introduced in other states,4
the legal community and the public will sharpen their focus on the
issue.
* B.A., 1975, Washington University (St. Louis); J.D., 1981, Vanderbilt University; mem-
ber of the Pennsylvania bar.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1964, at 1, col. 4.
2. The Tavern Rape: Cheers and No Help, NEwSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1983, at 25.
3. Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 22, 1983, at 3, col. 1. The Minnesota statute can be
found at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); the Massachusetts statute at MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1983); and the Rhode Island statute at RI GEN.
LAws §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.3 (Supp. 1984).
4. See Kiesel, Who Saw This Happen? States Move to Make Bystanders Responsible, 69
A.BA J. 1208 (1983); Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
I. THE AMERICAN RULE
With limited exceptions, there is no duty under Anglo-American
law to lend personal assistance to or obtain help for persons in dis-
tress, or to warn of imminent danger.5 Although the duty to assist
an injured or endangered person is commonplace throughout the
world,6 our law continues to rely solely on man's unselfish spirit. In
leading American cases on the subject, however, that spirit has
been wanting:
7
The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees
another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything
at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and
watch the man drown.' A physician is under no duty to answer
the call of one who is dying and might be saved,9 nor is anyone
required to play the part of Florence Nightingale and bind up
the wounds of a stranger who is bleeding to death, 0 or to pre-
vent a neighbor's child from hammering on a dangerous explo-
sive,"' or to remove a stone from the highway where it is a men-
ace to traffic, 2 or a train from a place where it blocks a fire
engine on its way to save a house,' 3 or even to cry a warning to
one who is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine. 4
A. Early History
Our rule can be traced to several sources. The early common law
was highly individualistic; it was feared that judicial intervention
in social and economic affairs would sap men of their self-reliance
5. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984).
6. See Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey of Criminal Law
Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 630 (1966); Rudzinski, The
Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in THE GOOD SAMARrrAN AND THE LAW 91 (J.
Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
7. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5.
8. Id. n.22 (citing Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928)).
9. Id. n.23 (citing Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901)).
10. Id. n.24 (citing Allen v. Hixson, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); Riley v. Gulf, C. &
S.F. Ry. Co., 160 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)).
11. Id. n.25 (citing Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955)).
12. Id. n.26 (citing O'Keefe v. William J. Barry Co., 311 Mass. 517, 42 N.E.2d 267 (1942)).
13. Id. n.27 (citing Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Scruggs & Echols, 161 Ala. 97, 49 So. 399
(1909)).
14. Id. n.28 (citing Toadvine v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., 20 F. Supp. 226 (D. Ky.
1937)).
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and encroach upon their individual freedom. 15 The emerging spirit
of capitalism16 -the belief that "the struggle of selfish individuals
automatically produces the common good of all"' 7-reinforced ju-
dicial reluctance to compel citizens to assist persons in trouble.
Partially from a desire to limit the scope of judicial intervention,
and partially from necessity, a distinction arose between "misfea-
sance" and "nonfeasance."' 8 It was felt that the common law
should be used "to prevent people from harming one another,
rather than to force them to confer benefits on one another." 9 At
the same time, the early jurists were able to redress only the most
severe breaches of the "King's peace." Generally, these incidents of
social violence and commercial disruption consisted of affirmative
acts, not omissions. Under the weight of stare decisis, this preoccu-
pation with affirmative acts and the desire to limit judicial inter-
vention evolved into the principle of not imposing liability for
omissions.20
B. Current Status
Over the years, this principle has been eroded,2 and there are
presently five situations in which our courts recognize a duty to
render aid. First, the duty may be imposed by statute. An example
found in many states is the "hit and run" statute requiring any
driver involved in an automobile accident, whether or not he was
at fault, to give assistance to those injured.22
Second, courts have imposed the duty to render assistance on
those who stand in certain relationship to injured or endangered
parties. These "special relationships" include parent to child,
spouse to spouse, common carrier to passenger, innkeeper to guest,
storekeeper to customer, host to social guest, employer to em-
15. Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 631, 632
(1952).
16. Id.
17. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 120.
18. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 56, at 373-75.
19. Linden, Rescuers and Good Samaritans, 34 MoD. L. REv. 241, 242 (1971) (construing
Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97, 112 (1908)).
20. Note, supra note 15, at 631-32. See generally C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON
TORTS 127-28 (1980).
21. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 56, at 373-74.
22. 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 289, 294 (1980).
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ployee, teacher or school official to student, and jailer to inmate. 3
The party on whom the duty is imposed need not have been re-
sponsible for the victim's peril. Courts have recognized this duty
only in relationships of the greatest intimacy and dependence, or
in which some economic benefit flows to the burdened party.
Third, the duty may be brought about by contract.2 4 A lifeguard,
for example, agrees to rescue drowning swimmers as one of the
terms of his employment. Firemen, police, nurses, baby-sitters, and
many others enter into agreements that require them to render
aid.
Fourth, one who negligently injures or imperils another has a
duty to render reasonable assistance.25 Many courts have broad-
ened this rule, placing the duty on anyone whose con-
duct-whether innocent or negligent-has caused injury or unrea-
sonable danger.2
Finally, one who volunteers aid is under a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care.2 1 He may abandon the effort, but only if the victim's
condition will not be worsened as a result.2
8
Two states, Vermont and Minnesota, have enacted statutes im-
posing on the general public a duty to aid those in distress.2 9 Ver-
mont's law, passed in 1967, requires anyone who knows that an-
other is in grave danger to render reasonable assistance, unless
such efforts would endanger the rescuer or interfere with "impor-
tant duties owed to others." The statute grants civil immunity for
all but "gross negligence"-in apparent contradiction to the re-
quirement of "reasonable assistance"-and establishes a criminal
23. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 56, at 376-77. Courts have gradually ex-
panded this set of relationships, with some notable exceptions. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, for example, refused to impose the duty on the hosts of business guests. See Yania v.
Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). The defendant coaxed his business guest to jump
into a deep, water-filled ditch, and then watched impassively as the guest drowned. The
court held there was no duty to render aid. 397 Pa. at 322, 155 A.2d at 346.
24. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26, at 185 (1972).
25. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 56, at 377.
26. Id.
27. 57 AM. JuR. 2D Negligence § 46 (1971).
28. See id.
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
Both statutes, along with a sampling of rescue statutes from other countries, are reprinted
in the appendix, infra.
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penalty of a fine not exceeding $100.30
Minnesota's statute, enacted in 1983 in response to the previ-
ously noted rape incident near Boston,31 resembles the Vermont
statute. The Minnesota statute, however, differs in two respects.
First, Minnesota imposes the duty to rescue only on persons who
are "at the scene of an emergency," while in Vermont the duty
falls upon anyone who "knows" of another in danger. Second, Min-
nesota does not explicitly suspend the duty when third parties are
already providing aid. Otherwise, the statutes are virtually identi-
cal, with Minnesota granting civil immunity to the rescuer for any-
thing short of "willful and wanton or reckless" conduct, and pro-
viding for a fine of not more than $100.2
Also in response to the bar rape incident, Rhode Island and
Massachusetts enacted more limited rescue statutes.3 3 In Rhode Is-
land, any witness to a sexual assault must immediately notify the
police. Victims are exempt from this requirement, and failure to
notify is classified as a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment
for not more than one year, a fine not to exceed $500, or both,34
The Massachusetts statute is similar, but applies to witnesses of
armed robberies and homicides as well as rapes, and carries a fine
of between $500 and $2500, but no imprisonment.3 5
While Vermont and Minnesota are the only states to have im-
posed a comprehensive duty to render assistance, every state and
the District of Columbia have enacted "Good Samaritan" statutes
designed to encourage physicians to provide emergency aid.3 6 Typi-
30. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
31. Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
32. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
The Minnesota statute provides that violation of the duty is a petty misdemeanor which,
under Minnesota law, carries a fine of not more than $100. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604.05 and
609.02 (West Supp. 1984).
33. Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3; see also Note, The Duty to Rescue in Cali-
fornia: A Legislative Solution?, 15 PAC. L.J. 1261, 1279 n.185 (1983).
34. R.I GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-3.1 to -3.4 (Supp. 1984).
35. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West Supp. 1983). Actually, the Rhode Island
and Massachusetts statutes are "rescue" statutes only to the extent that police might be
notified during the commission of a crime and might respond in time to prevent or mitigate
harm. Since witnesses could comply with their duty by notifying police shortly after the
commission of the crime, these statutes more closely resemble the common law ban against
"misprision of felony."
36. These statutes (except for that of Kentucky) are reprinted in 2 D. LOUISELL & HR
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cally, these statutes reduce the standard of care owed by physi-
cians who volunteer emergency medical care, imposing liability
only for gross negligence or bad faith.37 Coverage may extend to in-
state physicians, all physicians, all licensed medical personnel, or
all persons rendering emergency aid.3
These statutes were enacted as a result of widespread concern
that physicians were not volunteering their services in emergencies
for fear of subsequent malpractice actions.39 At least one study,
however, indicates that Good Samaritan statutes are generally in-
effective.40 Physicians may fear any involvement in embarrassing
malpractice litigation, not merely an unfavorable verdict, and may
believe that these statutes do not sufficiently discourage the filing
of suits. 41
Despite recent judicial and legislative expansion of the rescue
duty, its future is unclear. Some commentators predict the judicial
creation of a universal duty, and there is movement in a number of
states toward consideration of legislation similar. to the broad Min-
nesota and Vermont statutes or the narrower Massachusetts and
Rhode Island statutes.42 Even so, progress toward a public rescue
duty can only be characterized as slow and uneven.
II. THE CASE FOR A DUTY To RESCUE
The strongest argument for a universally applicable rescue duty
is that lives would be saved and injuries avoided. The existence of
a duty would encourage rescue in four subtly different ways: many
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 21.10-21.59 (1983). Kentucky's can be found at Ky.
REV. STAT. § 411.148 (1984).
37. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 36, § 21.05.
38. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52 n.12 (1972).
39. Note, Physicians-Civil Liability for Treatment Rendered at the Scene of an Emer-
gency, 1964 WIs. L. REV. 494, 497; see also Holland, The Good Samaritan Laws: A Reap-
praisal, 16 J. PUB. L. 128, 132 (1967). Studies have confirmed the existence of this fear. See
id. at 132 n.20.
40. Note, 1963 Professional-Liability Survey, 189 J. A.MA 859, 864-65 (1964).
41. Whatever its source, this fear would seem groundless. Remarkably, there appear to be
no recorded cases of malpractice arising from emergency medical aid volunteered by a phy-
sician outside of his office or hospital. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 36, § 21.01;
Holland, supra note 39 at 133-34; Note, California Good Samaritan Legislation: Exemp-
tions from Civil Liability While Rendering Emergency Medical Aid, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 816,
817 n.7 (1963).
42. See Kiesel, supra note 4; Christian Science Monitor, supra note 3.
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people would act out of a desire to be law abiding; others would act
out of fear of legal sanctions, particularly when witnesses were pre-
sent; some who are timid would be provided with the necessary
motivation to intervene; and still others would be moved to action
by a heightened sense of the morality of rescue.
This last point rests on the premise that law not only reflects
society's moral values, but also helps shape them. As one commen-
tator asserts, "Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic relation; one
'learns' what is moral by observing what other people. . tend to
enforce."4 3 Accordingly, a legal duty to rescue would increase the
number of persons who feel morally compelled to offer emergency
aid. This, in turn, would increase the likelihood that people would
render assistance in situations in which the failure to do so would
go undetected.
No one, however, disputes the need to promote rescue. Instead,
the issue is whether such a duty places too great a burden on per-
sonal freedom or presents insurmountable administrative
difficulties.44
One of the most common criticisms of a rescue duty is that re-
quiring the performance of affirmative acts is unduly coercive and
beyond the legitimate scope of government.45 Omissions, it is ar-
43. D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798, 809 (1975). Studies
support the existence of this relationship. In one, a group was given a number of fact situa-
tions, such as that of a bystander who watched idly as a man drowned 10 feet from shore.
They were told that an attempt to rescue was required by law. Another group was given
identical facts, except that an attempt to rescue was not required. A greater proportion of
the first group felt that the actions of the passive observer were morally wrong. The exis-
tence of a legal duty apparently helped the subjects define the failure to rescue as immoral.
See Kaufmann, Legality and Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure to Intervene as Deter-
minants of Moral Judgment, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDIES OF SoME ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 77-81 (J. Macauley & L. Berkowitz eds.
1970).
44. An alternative which avoids the imposition of a coercive legal duty, yet has universal
appeal, would be to offer cash rewards for rescue. Austria has adopted such a plan. When a
rescuer risks his own life to save that of another, he is eligible for a cash award from a
public fund. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 117.
This approach presents some serious problems, however. It not only invites false claims
and contrived rescues, but the powerful appeal of cash rewards would also induce some to
take foolish risks in dangerous situations, and others to intermeddle when no real danger
exists.
45. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196,
214 (1946).
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gued, should not be punished. There are, however, two flaws in this
argument. First, the distinction between acts of commission and
those of omission is often meaningless. To use a grim example,
most would agree that a mother who intentionally starves her
healthy child should not be dealt with by the law any differently
than the mother who intentionally poisons her child. Surely, no
one would argue that the first mother is less morally culpable sim-
ply because starvation is an act of omission. Because the law
should not (and does not4") distinguish between these situations,
there seems little reason to exempt other acts of omission which
lead to odious results.47 Second, despite dicta to the contrary,
omissions have long served as a basis for liability in our system.
Failure to file one's tax return, to stop at a red light, or to install
required safety devices in one's factory are just a few examples of
punishable omissions.
A related argument against the duty is that, while it may be ap-
propriate to compel certain affirmative acts, rescue is not one of
them. To some, a rescue duty constitutes an attempt to enforce
unselfishness and raises the specter of "Big Brother. '48 It is felt
that the decision to intervene in an emergency should be left to an
individual's conscience, even when something as simple as a call to
the police could save a life. The rebuttal to this argument is sim-
ple. Certainly government should not be in the business of coercing
kindness, and should require an individual to confer a benefit on
another only when the value of the benefit sufficiently outweighs
the cost of providing it. For example, our laws requiring parents to
send their children to school4 are generally accepted as legitimate
exercises of governmental power. Both child and society derive sig-
nificant benefit, and the deprivation of the parents' freedom to
46. 2 C. TORCiA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 173 (14th ed. 1979).
47. There is also a philosophical objection to punishing omissions. Some argue that be-
cause a victim's harm would have occurred even if the person who failed to act had not been
present, it cannot be said that the omission caused the harm. Gregory, Gratuitous Under-
takings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 30, 34-35 (1951). However, as in the
leading American cases summarized earlier, people are frequently in a position to prevent
harm, but simply choose not to. In such situations, it seems fatuous to assert that the failure
to act has caused no harm.
48. See Morris, Rescue and the Common Law: England and Australia, in THE GOOD SA-
MARITAN AND THE LAW 142 (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
49. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3212 (McKinney 1981).
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keep their children at home is an acceptable cost. Other examples
are laws requiring employers to provide safe workplaces,5" or medi-
cal personnel and other persons to report suspected child abuse.51
In much the same way, the benefit provided by a legal rescue
duty-the saving of lives-justifies the deprivation of our freedom
to remain passive in emergencies.
One can always conjure up "worst case" scenarios in which pros-
ecution under a rescue statute would work an injustice or inordi-
nately drain state resources. This, however, can happen under any
criminal law, and merely emphasizes the importance of the sound
exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to bring charges and judi-
cial discretion to dismiss de minimis infractions.52
Another criticism of the duty is that a bystander would be
forced to imperil his own life for the sake of a stranger.5 3 It is in-
conceivable, however, that a rescue law would require such a sacri-
fice. No existing statute does. 4 Further, most suspend the duty in
the face of serious bodily harm, and some in the face of any harm
at all to health or property, or any interference with obligations to
third parties.55
Others have expressed the concern that, in many situations,
there would be uncertainty about the need to intervene, and that
this may lead to "officious intermeddling" in the affairs of stran-
gers.5 6 It is true that sometimes even the most carefully drawn rule
50. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.115 (1983). See generally Paulsen, Child Abuse Re-
porting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUL L. REv. 1 (1967).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53. Linden, supra note 19, at 242.
54. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519
(1973); Feldbrugge, supra note 6, at 636-38; Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 105-07.
55. See supra note 54.
56. One commentator, for example, poses a hypothetical in which "a potential rescuer
observing a young man and woman struggling in the back seat of an automobile may not be
sure whether he is watching a rough-and-tumble courtship or imminent rape." Henderson,
Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 934 & n.163 (1982). The writer sug-
gests that, since one could not be certain whether calling the police would prove helpful or
embarrassing, a rescue duty would be inappropriate in this situation. Id. Such a scenario,
however, actually underscores the need for a rescue duty. Our police should be called to
investigate not only unambiguous instances of criminal activity,'but also situations in which
there is reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring. In the above hypothetical, for exam-
ple, the benefit of possibly preventing a rape would certainly outweigh the risk of causing
some embarrassment to the acrobatic lovers.
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
may leave doubt about the necessity of intervention, and that in-
appropriate intervention may occur. However, as Dean Prosser
notes:
[T]he infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it im-
possible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable
human conduct. The utmost that can be done is to devise some-
thing in the nature of a formula, the application of which in
each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court.57
With a rescue duty, the consistent application of a sound formula
governing the necessity of intervention would minimize the risk of
intermeddling.
Another concern involves situations in which two or more poten-
tial rescuers are present. If no one attempts rescue, critics ask,
which of them would be held liable? 58 The answer would appear to
be that all should be held liable. There is no reason to limit indi-
vidual liability simply because others have simultaneously engaged
in the same unacceptable conduct. When a group of persons com-
mits a robbery, for example, each is no less morally or legally re-
sponsible than if he had acted alone.59
A related question arises when only one of a number of bystand-
ers renders aid: would the others be liable? The answer found in
most existing statutes is that as soon as one person provides assis-
tance, all others are relieved of the duty. 0 If, however, that assis-
tance were reckless or otherwise inadequate, would the other by-
standers still be relieved of their duty? A sensible answer would be
"no," that only the rendering of reasonable assistance would sus-
pend the duty. Since reckless or inadequate aid is little better than
no aid at all, and might even aggravate a victim's condition, it
57. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 32, at 173.
58. See, e.g., Linden, supra note 19, at 242.
59. A related criticism is that rescue litigation stemming from Kitty Genovese-type inci-
dents may involve large numbers of defendants, and that such proceedings would be un-
manageable. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 56, at 936-37. This criticism has three flaws.
First, the Kitty Genovese tragedy was quite unusual. Rescue situations will more typically
involve only one or a small number of potential defendants. Second, it is precisely incidents
such as the one involving Kitty Genovese which we find most offensive and must take steps
to deter. Finally, our system has demonstrated over time that it is quite capable of accom-
modating large numbers of defendants in both civil and criminal actions.
60. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); Feldbrugge, supra note 6, at 641.
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makes little sense to suspend the duty until reasonable assistance
has been provided."'
Finally, it is feared that if many persons simultaneously attempt
rescue, the result will be chaos and failure.6 2 This is unlikely, how-
ever. It seems more probable that the tendency of people to coop-
erate during an emergency would actually increase the chance of a
successful rescue.
Some critics question the enforceability of the duty. They worry
that nonrescuers would often be difficult to trace, and nearly im-
possible when not witnessed by others. While this concern has
merit, our law enforcement agencies are well accustomed to dealing
with problems of detection.
Other critics suggest that individuals may take foolish risks
knowing that bystanders have a duty to come to their aid.6 3 This
concern seems unwarranted. Certainly people would realize that
the existence of a rescue duty would not in itself assure that by-
standers would act, or that the rescue would be successful even if
they did.
Others have noted that, in a criminal prosecution, it might be
difficult to establish that a bystander knew of injury or peril.64
However, the problem of proving what was on a defendant's mind
exists, in nearly every criminal prosecution, and is simplified by the
use of circumstantial evidence.6 5
61. Two nagging questions remain from this type of situation. First, if there were an inor-
dinate delay before one member of a group of bystanders offered aid, could the others be
held liable for the failure to act? The answer would seem to be "usually not." It would be
difficult to prove the negative proposition that ultimately these observers would not have
intervened. A more troublesome question arises if injury to the victim resulted during the
delay and could have been prevented by timely assistance. Could, under these circum-
stances, the bystanders or even the rescuer be held liable? The answer to this question
would depend upon the degree of care required under the applicable. rescue law. If, for ex-
ample, one must offer "reasonable assistance," an unreasonable delay would be the basis for
liability. If, however, liability were imposed only for gross negligence, liability would be less
likely.
62. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 45, at 215.
63. See, e.g., D'Amato, supra note 43, at 808.
64. See, e.g., Wehrwein, Samaritan Law Poses Difficulties, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 5,
col. 1.
65. There are two other concerns associated with criminal prosecutions. One is the possi-
bility that a nonrescuer might be convicted even though the victim's assailant is acquitted.
See, e.g., Kiesel, supra note 4, at 1208-09. This, however, would not necessarily be an unjust
result. The duty to aid would be triggered whenever a victim was injured or imperiled, and
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A final concern is that a rescue duty would deprive society of
clear examples of heroic conduct by making it uncertain whether
rescue had been occasioned by altruistic impulses or by fear of le-
gal sanctions.6" However, any rescue law would almost certainly
provide-as is the case in Vermont, Minnesota, and Eu-
rope 7-that a would-be rescuer need not imperil his own life. As
such, there would be ample opportunity for heroism. 8
The creation of a legal rescue duty, whether through case law or
statute, would come at a time when social forces favoring rescue
are at an ebb. As our society has become more mobile, individuals
have tended to lose their community identity and their depen-
dence upon other community members. Unlike earlier times, one's
set of primary acquaintances often excludes neighbors, merchants,
and local public servants. As the bonds among community mem-
bers weaken, so must the social pressure and individual desire to
assist members in distress. A legal duty to rescue would, in part,
replace the waning social duty.
III. PROPOSED STATUTE
The resistance of Anglo-American law to a rescue duty is not
typical of other legal systems. Nearly all of continental Europe, for
example, has adopted the duty. Portugal did so first, including it in
would not require that his plight result from the commission of a crime. Another concern is
that eyewitnesses to crime who did not comply with their duty to render aid might be reluc-
tant to come forward or to testify truthfully for fear of incriminating themselves. See, e.g.,
Wehrwein, supra note 64. Some potential witnesses might indeed be reluctant to come for-
ward, and an occasional prosecution might be lost as a result. This, however, may be the
unavoidable price of a law which would save lives and prevent injuries. Those witnesses who
did come forward or who otherwise could be placed at the scene could be encouraged to
testify truthfully through a grant of immunity from prosecution.
66. See, e.g., Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 120; Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts
on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1273, 1292 (1983).
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973);
Feldbrugge, supra note 6, at 636-37; Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 105-07.
68. One writer speculates that a duty to rescue might play into the hands of those staging
"phony accidents." D'Amato, supra note 43, at 811 n.47. Typically, in such a scheme an
individual along a roadside will pretend to be in distress. When a well-intentioned driver
stops to help, he is robbed. The writer suggests that the duty to render aid might increase
the number of people susceptible to such a scheme. He concludes, however, that the increase
in the number of drivers pulling over is just as likely to discourage this practice. The phony-
accident perpetrator, dependent on the goodwill of only an occasional passerby, would be
overwhelmed by witnesses. Id.
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the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867. Since then, these European
countries have followed suit: the Netherlands (1881), Finland
(1889), Italy (1889 and 1930), Norway (1902), Russia (1903-1917
and 1960), Turkey (1926), Denmark (1930), Poland (1932), Ger-
many (1935 and 1953), Rumania (1938), France (1941 and 1945),
Hungary (1948 and 1961), Greece (1950), Czechoslovakia (1950),
Bulgaria (1951), Yugoslavia (1951), Albania (1952), Switzerland (in
several "cantons" at various times), Spain (1960), and Belgium
(1961).69
Based on the strong case for a duty to rescue, the following
model statute is proposed:
DUTY TO RENDER AID
§ 1. Criminal Liability
Any person who knows that another is in imminent danger
of or has sustained serious physical harm, and who fails to
render reasonable assistance, shall be imprisoned for not
more than one year, fined not more than $2500, or both.
§ 2. Civil Liability
Any person who knows or reasonably should know that an-
other is in imminent danger of or has sustained serious
physical harm, and who fails to render reasonable assis-
tance, shall be liable in a civil action for damages.
§ 3. Scope of Reasonable Assistance
Reasonable assistance may include rendering or attempt-
ing to render any of the following types of assistance: di-
rect personal assistance, summoning law enforcement or
medical personnel or other qualified persons, warning of
imminent danger, or other appropriate assistance.
§ 4. Defenses
It shall be a defense to an action brought under section 1
or section 2 that rendering reasonable assistance would
have posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
the defendant or third parties, or that reasonable assis-
69. Feldbrugge, supra note 6, at 655-57; Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 91-92. Both articles
present a comprehensive review of European rescue statutes.
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tance was being provided by others.
§ 5. Effect On Liability For Criminal Homicide
Nothing contained in this Act shall alter existing law with
respect to liability for criminal homicide.
§ 6. Compensation For Injury To Rescuer
Any person who is physically injured as a result of render-
ing assistance required under sections 1 and 2 shall be
compensated for such injuries by the state, provided that
the party seeking compensation exercised reasonable care
and was not under an independent duty to render assis-
tance. This section shall not be construed to limit existing
civil remedies for injuries incurred by a party attempting
rescue, except that a person shall be limited to either pur-
suing such civil remedies or seeking compensation under
this section.
A. To Whom Duty Applies
Unlike Good Samaritan statutes, the model statute imposes a
duty to render aid and is applicable to all persons. The desirability
of a public rescue duty has been discussed above.
B. Situations in Which Duty Applies
Under the model statute, the duty applies whether the victim's
plight was caused by an unavoidable accident or by wrongful con-
duct. This feature is consistent with most existing statutes,7 0 and
includes danger or injury brought about by a victim's own negli-
gence. It would be undesirable to remove the duty in such situa-
tions. First, society's interest in the preservation of life includes
the lives of those who are careless. Second, the statute provides
that no rescuer will be called upon to risk life or limb in a rescue
effort. Finally, few potential rescuers have the factual information
or legal expertise necessary to determine whether a victim had
been negligent.
The duty to render aid under the model statute is triggered
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973);
Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 95.
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when "another is in imminent danger of or has sustained serious
physical harm." Many existing statutes, however, impose the duty
only in the face of life-threatening risk.71 The more demanding ap-
proach of the model statute can be justified in two ways. First, the
duty is suspended whenever rescue poses the risk of serious injury
to the rescuer; the potential benefit to the victim, therefore, would
always exceed the sacrifice demanded of the rescuer. Second, a res-
cuer is often unable to distinguish a life-threatening risk from one
which threatens only serious injury. By requiring that the danger a
victim faces be "imminent," the statute is applicable only in true
emergency situations. As with almost all existing statutes, the mere
risk of damage to the victim's property does not actuate the duty. 2
Under the model statute, the rescue duty is not suspended even
when the death of the endangered party appears certain. Admit-
tedly, it is important to limit the instances in which a potential
rescuer is called upon to make sacrifices on behalf of a stranger. In
emergency situations, however, it is often difficult to judge the cer-
tainty of death: an onlooker may believe that someone is hope-
lessly trapped, when in fact an effort at rescue would reveal a way
to set the endangered party free; a layman might conclude that an
unconscious or bloody victim has no chance of survival, when actu-
ally his injuries are far less severe. Removing the need for a deter-
mination of the certainty of death would eliminate many mistaken
judgments.
The duty also remains in force when an endangered party is at-
tempting to take his own life. Since a rescuer is not required to
face serious harm, however, the model statute would not call upon
him to risk grave injury for the sake of one who did not wish to
live.
C. Type of Liability
Of the Vermont, Minnesota, and European statutes, nearly all
provide for criminal liability, and many provide for criminal and
civil liability.7 3 The model statute establishes both.
71. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 96.
72. See Feldbrugge, supra note 6, at 633.
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 519 (1973);
Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 108, 111-15.
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The argument for criminal sanctions is clear. A strong, well-pub-
licized criminal penalty would be a deterrent to nonrescue,74 and
would constitute the only deterrent for judgment-proof individu-
als. The proposed statute provides for a criminal penalty of impris-
onment for up to one year, a fine of up to $2500, or both. Currently
in the United States and Europe, criminal sanctions range in se-
verity from the French penalty of imprisonment for up to five
years75 to the Vermont and Minnesota penalties of a fine not ex-
ceeding $100.76 The proposed penalty-not excessive, yet strong
enough that the duty will be taken seriously- falls somewhere in
between. As with most rescue statutes,77 criminal sanctions could
be imposed whether or not harm resulted from a failure to rescue.
This is consistent with the bulk of our criminal statutes, which re-
quire only a culpable state of mind and a voluntary act or omis-
sion, not harm.
The issue of whether to impose civil liability is not as simple. In
most jurisdictions, the existence of a criminal statute would render
the issue moot. The doctrine of "negligence per se," making the
violation of a criminal statute conclusive evidence of negligence,78
would make failure to rescue tortious. Nevertheless, there are
questions about the desirability of a private remedy.
First, some critics feel that forcing a nonrescuer to compensate a
victim may be unfair. They point out that the peril a victim faces
may have been brought about by his own carelessness or willing-
ness to take risks, 9 or by the wrongdoing of a third party,80 and
that other nonrescuers may not have been joined in the action.,
The counterargument is that there are safeguards against such un-
74. As used herein, nonrescue denotes a substandard rescue effort as well as a complete
failure to act.
75. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 110. But see A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PE-
NAL CODE OF JAPAN 1961 arts. 293 & 296 (carrying a more severe penalty than the French
statute if death or injury results from a failure to rescue), reprinted in appendix infra.
76. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
77. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973);
Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 108-10.
78. C. MORRsS & C. MORRIS, JR., supra note 20, at 61. The doctrine rests on the premise
that one who violates a criminal statute has acted unreasonably. Id.
79. See, e.g., Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 114.
80. See, e.g., id.
81. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 56, at 936.
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fairness. A nonrescuer could assert the defense of contributory or
comparative negligence against a careless victim, and may be able
to raise assumption of risk against a foolhardy victim. 2 A
nonrescuer may also be entitled to seek contribution" or indem-
nity8 4 from the wrongdoer who originally injured or endangered the
victim, or contribution from others who failed to rescue.85
Next, allowing civil recovery for nonrescue has been criticized as
a method of rewarding risk taking." It is by no means clear, how-
ever, that emergency victims are greater risk takers than other per-
sons. A victim's peril is often caused by an act of nature, a latent
danger, or the wrongdoing of a third party.
Finally, it is feared that the causal link between a failure to res-
cue and a victim's harm would be too difficult to prove. 7 This link,
however, has been sufficiently demonstrated in cases arising from
our current limited duty to rescue. Further, the causation problems
stemming from rescue situations would be no more severe than
those routinely encountered in traditional negligence litigation.
Whatever the merit of these concerns, it is outweighed by the
need to promote rescue and to compensate victims. Accordingly,
the model statute establishes civil as well as criminal liability.
The measure of damages should be all injuries incurred by the
victim from the moment the potential rescuer violated his duty,
82. In situations in which a nonrescuer warned a venturesome victim that he would not
come to his aid, assumption of risk could be asserted. It is unclear, however, whether the
defense could be raised by a victim who was unaware of the presence of a potential rescuer
or of his unwillingness to render aid. The victim might argue that, without such knowledge,
it would be logically impossible for him to appreciate or accept the risk of the nonrescuer's
behavior. The nonrescuer, on the other hand, might contend that when the foolhardy victim
assumed the risk of injury associated with his activity, he also assumed the risk that he
might not be rescued. Unfortunately, there is little case law on this point.
The defenses of contributory and comparative negligence cannot be raised if a defendant's
conduct was intended to cause harm. 57 AM. Jur. 2D NEGLIGENCE §§ 304, 438 (1971). These
defenses, and that of assumption of risk, will often be unavailable if a defendant acted reck-
lessly, id. §§ 286, 304, 438, or if his negligence is imputed from the violation of a criminal
statute. Id. §§ 286, 308, 438.
83. See 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAw: LIABILITY & LrITGATION §§ 26.21-26.22 (1977).
84. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 51, at 343.
85. See 1 J. DOOLEY, supra note 83.
86. D'amato, supra note 43, at 808.
87. See, e.g., Note, The Bad Samaritan: Rescue Reexamined, 54 GEo. L.J. 629, 640 (1966).
Since harm from nonrescue would not be an element of criminal liability, this criticism
would not apply to criminal prosecutions.
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but only to the extent that such injuries would have been pre-
vented by reasonable assistance. Under this formula, a nonrescuer
would bear no responsibility for an injury that he could not have
prevented or to which he did not contribute.8 The issues of
whether a victim's cause of action survives his death and whether
his survivors may bring a separate action on their own behalf are
settled by each jurisdiction's "survival" and "wrongful death" acts,
respectively.
D. Rescuer's State of Mind
To be criminally liable under the model statute, a person must
"know" that another is injured or endangered. He may be liable
for civil damages, however, if he "knows or reasonably should
know" of injury or danger. This scheme is consistent with the com-
mon law view that the harsh sanctions of criminal law should be
reserved for those who act with some degree of mens rea.
The Minnesota statute, as well as a number of European stat-
utes, imposes a duty to rescue only on those who actually witness
an emergency. 9 This rule needlessly limits the scope of the duty.
For example, a physician who is told of a seriously injured man a
block away would be under no obligation to render aid, and an
individual who learns of people trapped in a burning building
would be under no duty to summon help.
E. Standard of Care for Rescue Effort
Under the proposed statute, a would-be rescuer must provide
"reasonable assistance," which "may include rendering or attempt-
ing to render any of the following types of assistance: direct per-
sonal assistance, summoning law enforcement or medical personnel
or other qualified persons, warning of imminent danger, or other
appropriate assistance." Since the duty is suspended whenever a
potential rescuer faces the threat of serious physical harm, he
would rarely if ever be called on to intervene physically during the
88. Of course, if responsibility for a victim's harm cannot reasonably be apportioned be-
tween the event which initially injured or endangered him and the failure to rescue, the
nonrescuer may be liable for the entire harm. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5,
§ 52, at 345.
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984); Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 101-02.
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commission of a crime.
In contrast to the model statute, Vermont provides a civil rem-
edy only for gross negligence.90 Minnesota does so only for "willful
and wanton or reckless" acts.9 1 This lower standard of care can
hardly be viewed as a method of promoting rescue attempts since
rescue is required. 2 A better explanation is that "it is unfair both
to require a person to act and to hold him to a standard that he
cannot meet because of some personal limitation that is not tradi-
tionally taken into account when the law judges the reasonableness
of behavior."93 Nonetheless, there are a number of reasons to re-
quire reasonable assistance. First, there are well-developed tort
principles which address the problem of an individual who, be-
cause of mental or physical deficiency or infancy, is unable to exer-
cise reasonable care.94 Second, reasonable care is defined in light of
all circumstances. Thus, courts would consider the fact that even
the most prudent rescuer would be forced to make hasty decisions
in an emergency. 5 Third, the notion that there are distinct degrees
of negligence and corresponding degrees of care has been generally
discredited as illogical and unworkable.9 6 Fourth, although many
90. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984).
92. Franklin, supra note 38, at 57-58.
93. Id. at 58.
94. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 32, at 175-85.
95. Dean Prosser states that
The courts have been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted
with an emergency is not to be held to the standard of conduct normally ap-
plied to one who is in no such situation .... [T]he basis of the special rule is
merely that the actor is left no time for adequate thought, or is reasonably so
disturbed or excited that the actor cannot weigh alternative courses of action,
and must make a speedy decision, based very largely upon impulse or guess.
Under such conditions, the actor cannot reasonably be held to the same accu-
racy of judgment or conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect,
even though it later appears that the actor made the wrong decision, one which
no reasonable person could possibly have made after due deliberation. The ac-
tor's choice "may be mistaken yet prudent."
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 33, at 196.
96. W. PROSSER & W. KETO1, supra note 5, § 34, at 209-11. Whenever a court or legisla-
ture raises or lowers the degree of care owed in certain situations or by certain actors, it is
because of the belief that requiring reasonable care under those particular circumstances is
inappropriate. Such a belief, however, reflects a misunderstanding of the term. Reasonable
care means care which is reasonable under all the circumstances. 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 11(3) (1966). This would necessarily include any extenuating circumstances which a court
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emergencies require specialized medical or rescue skills, the un-
trained rescuer would be responsible only for skills possessed by
the imaginary "reasonable man."9 Fifth, reasonable care is the
standard of behavior normally required under tort law,9" and to
require less may well encourage carelessness.
Under criminal law, there is generally no liability for the omis-
sion of an act which an individual was physically incapable of per-
forming.9 9 In addition, the traditional defenses of insanity, dimin-
ished responsibility, incompetency to stand trial, and automatism
would be available to the mentally deficient criminal defendant,
and the defense of infancy may be available to the young
defendant.
The proposed statute does not contain the provision found in
some European statutes relieving a rescuer of further obligation
upon informing appropriate authorities of an emergency. 00 Such
provisions remove the duty prematurely. There are many emer-
gency situations in which informing local authorities would not
avert danger or further injury, yet providing personal assistance
might. For example, a child drowning in shallow water could not
wait for help to be summoned, but might be saved by the immedi-
ate efforts of a bystander. Similarly, a man lying severely injured
in the woods may not survive until medical personnel arrive, yet
might be saved if given immediate attention.
F. Defenses
The model statute establishes two defenses against liability for
failure to rescue. First, a failure to act is excused if rescue entails a
"substantial risk of serious physical harm" to the rescuer or third
parties. The model thus requires rescuers to confront an interme-
diate degree of risk: one existing statute suspends the duty only in
the face of life-threatening risk, while others suspend it with any
or legislature might contemplate. The standard is relative, requiring different amounts of
care in different situations, and thus is applicable to all situations.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299 comment e (1965).
98. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 11(1) (1966). Reasonable care is synonymous with "ordinary
care." Id.
99. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 24, § 26, at 188.
100. Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 108.
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risk to life, health, or property.10 1 It seems reasonable to demand
more than the latter. After all, there are few situations which in-
volve no risk at all to the health or property of a rescuer. Requiring
a rescuer to face the threat of less than serious harm in order to
protect human life seems to strike the fairest balance between the
interests of rescuer, victim, and society.
Nonrescue is also excused when others are already providing rea-
sonable assistance. The purpose of the statute is not to force every-
one present to participate in a rescue attempt, but simply to en-
sure that some attempt is made. It is, however, no defense that
other potential rescuers failed to act; the passivity of others would
make the nonrescuer no less blameworthy.
In a tort action, the defendant would have the burden of persua-
sion with regard to these defenses. 0 2 In a criminal prosecution, he
would have at least the burden of producing evidence, and some-
times the burden of persuasion, as well. 03 This is appropriate be-
cause the defendant would often be in a superior position to
demonstrate that the risk he faced was excessive or that others
were providing aid. The plaintiff or prosecution may, for example,
be hard pressed to prove the negative proposition that the defen-
dant suffers from no medical condition which would have made
rescue especially risky. Similarly, a victim who was unconscious or
distracted, or whose view was obstructed, might have difficulty es-
tablishing that no one attempted rescue. In both types of situa-
tions, the defendant may well have exclusive access to information
needed by the fact-finder.
G. Liability for Criminal Homicide
Criminal homicide is the unlawful taking of another life.'04 One
might expect that if rescue were required by law, any death result-
ing from failure to rescue would constitute criminal homicide, sub-
jecting a nonrescuer to severe sanctions. 105 This, however, would
101. For a discussion of the risk a rescuer must face under existing statutes, see Feld-
brugge, supra note 6, at 636-38; Rudzinski, supra note 6, at 105-07.
102. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 57 (1954).
103. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 24, §8, at 46-48.
104. 2 C. ToRCIA, supra note 46, § 112.
105. Depending upon its classification, failure to rescue might also constitute the felony
necessary for "felony-murder" or the misdemeanor necessary for "misdemeanor-
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abrogate the intent of the model statute-to fairly and evenhand-
edly penalize nonrescue-and even breed contempt for the new
law. To avoid this result, the model contains the proviso that ex-
isting liability for criminal homicide shall not be altered.
H. Compensation for Injury to Rescuer
The proposed statute provides that a rescuer may be compen-
sated from a public fund for physical injuries incurred in a rescue
attempt.108 To be eligible, the rescuer must have exercised reasona-
ble care and must not have been under an independent duty to
render aid. 10 7 The statute states that this method of recovery
"shall not be construed to limit existing civil remedies [for a res-
cuer's injuries]." Accordingly, a victim or third party whose negli-
gence created an emergency would, under the "rescue" doctrine,
remain liable to an injured rescuer who had acted reasonably. l08
Despite the partial overlap, it is desirable to provide both meth-
ods of recovery. An advantage of the rescue doctrine is that it al-
lows a rescuer's loss to be borne by the party whose wrongdoing
brought about the need for rescue. It does not, however, cover situ-
ations in which a victim's peril is created by a natural act or una-
voidable accident, or the negligent party cannot be located or is
judgment proof. The model statute would enable these equally de-
serving rescuers to be compensated; and, because they nobly
served the state's interest in the preservation of life, the state is an
appropriate party to bear their losses.
To prevent double recovery by a rescuer, the model would limit
a rescuer to the election of a single remedy. In addition to prevent-
ing double recovery, this would limit the number of actions
manslaughter."
106. It is debatable whether nonphysical injuries and other losses should be included.
Justice might seem to require that an injured rescuer-acting at the behest of the state and
on behalf of a stranger-be compensated for all losses. However, nonphysical injuries are
more difficult to prove than physical injuries, and would require the establishment of a more
sophisticated administrative apparatus to sort through such claims. Nonphysical injuries are
also more difficult to disprove, a fact that would invite false claims. The cost of this more
sophisticated apparatus, higher compensation awards, and fraud might constitute an inordi-
nate burden on state resources.
107. For a discussion of the five situations in which an independent duty arises, see supra
text accompanying notes 22-28.
108. 1 J. DOOLEY, supra note 83, § 3.08.50.
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brought, minimizing the administrative burden." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Outside of the common law countries, there has been little resis-
tance to a public rescue duty. Nearly all of continental Europe, for
example, has adopted the duty. In Portugal and the Netherlands,
it has been in force for over one hundred years.
Within our own system, commentators have roundly condemned
our rule requiring no assistance to those in distress, and courts
have long ago abandoned the highly individualistic approach that
fostered the rule. Despite this, only Vermont and Minnesota have
enacted comprehensive rescue duties, and only then with token
penalties. The remaining forty-eight states still subscribe to a rule
that is, in the words of Dean Prosser, "revolting to any moral
sense."
110
109. An alternative approach would be to place the following limitations on recovery: an
award from the state would be reduced by an amount equal to any prior award in a civil
action for the same injuries; when an award in a civil action is received subsequent to an
award from the state, the rescuer would be required to reimburse the state up to the amount
of the prior state award. This method of preventing double recovery, while not limiting the
number of actions filed, would tend to conserve state funds expended directly for
compensation.
110. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 56, at 375.
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APPENDIX
Examples of Rescue Statutes
Vermont
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be ren-
dered without danger or peril to himself or without interfer-
ence with important duties owed to others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or
care is being provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compli-
ance with subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in
civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negligence or
unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration.
Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law
with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing
arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his
practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this sec-
tion shall be fined not more than $100.00.111
Minnesota
1. Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency
who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered
grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he can do so
without danger or peril to himself or others, give reasonable
assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable assistance
may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law
enforcement or medical personnel. Any person who violates
this section shall be guilty of a petty misdemeanor [and
subject to a fine of not more than $100].
2. General immunity from liability. Any person, including a
public or private nonprofit volunteer firefighter, volunteer
police officer, volunteer ambulance attendant, and volunteer
first provider of emergency medical services, who without
compensation or the expectation of compensation renders
111. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
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emergency care at the scene of an emergency or during
transit to a location where professional medical care can be
rendered, is not liable for any civil damages as a result of
acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency
care unless that person acts in a willful and wanton or reck-
less manner in providing the care. Any person rendering
emergency care during the course of regular employment,
and receiving compensation or expecting to receive compen-
sation for rendering such care, shall be excluded from the
protection of this section.
For the purposes of this section, the scene of an emer-
gency shall be those areas not within the confines of a hos-
pital or other institution which has hospital facilities, or an
office of a person licensed to practice one or more of the
healing arts ....
For the purposes of this section, compensation does not
include nominal payments, reimbursement for expenses, or
pension benefits.112
France
Any person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assis-
tance to an endangered person when such was possible
without danger to himself or others, shall be subject to [im-
prisonment for no less than three months nor more than
five years, a fine from 36,000 to 1,500,000 francs, or both]."'
Italy
Anyone, finding a human body which is or appears to be
lifeless, or a person who is wounded or otherwise in peril,
who fails to provide necessary assistance or to give immedi-
ate notice to the authorities, shall be subject to [imprison-
ment for up to three months or a fine of up to 120,000 lire].
If such behavior on the part of the offender results in per-
sonal injury, the punishment shall be increased; if it results
112. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1984).
113. Translation of the relevant part of art. 63 of the Code Penal (1810 as amended,
1959), appearing in THE FRENCH PPNAL CODE 38 (The American Series of Foreign Penal
Codes, vol. 1, G. Mueller ed. 1960).
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in death, the punishment shall be doubled.1 14
Russia
Failure to render aid which is necessary and clearly not suf-
fering of postponement to a person in danger of his life, if
the offender knew that such aid could be given without seri-
ous danger to himself or other persons, or failure to inform
the proper authorities or persons about the necessity to
render aid, is punished with corrective labor not exceeding
six months or with public censure, or entails the application
of social-corrective measures. [Identical provisions in Arme-
nia, art. 128; Belorussia, art. 125; Georgia, art. 130; Lithua-
nia, art. 128; Kirgizia, art. 124; Tadzhikistan, art. 136.]115
Japan
Article 293. A person who abandons another in need of help
because of age, immaturity, deformity, injury or illness or
for any other reason shall be punished by imprisonment for
one year or less.
Article 296. A person who violates this chapter and thereby
causes bodily injury to or endangers the life of another shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor
more than ten years. If the death of another thereby results,
punishment shall be imprisonment for three years or
more.
116
114. Translation of the relevant part of art. 593 of the Codice Penale (1930), appearing in
THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 199 (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, vol. 23, G.
Mueller ed. 1978).
115. Translation of art. 127 of the Russian penal code (1960), appearing in Feldbrugge,
supra note 6, at 656-57 app.
116. Translation of arts. 293 & 296 of the draft of the revised Japanese penal code, ap-
pearing in A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE OF JAPAN 1961 88 (The
American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, vol. 8, B. George ed. 1964).
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